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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Defendants Defenders, Inc., ADT LLC, and ADT 
Security Services, Inc. (“ADT SSI-Tyco”)1 (collectively, 
“defendants”) appeal with leave of this Court from the District 
Court’s January 25, 2018 Memorandum and Order granting 
plaintiff Norman Walsh’s motion to remand the case.  Walsh 
filed this action in the Superior Court of New Jersey and sought 
an order to remand the case to that court after Defenders, Inc. 
removed the case to the District Court under the Class Action 
Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).  The District 
Court originally denied Walsh’s motion to remand but, on 
Walsh’s motion for reconsideration, granted the motion to 
remand based on CAFA’s local controversy exception to district 
court class action jurisdiction in actions subject to CAFA.  28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4).  Though we have granted defendants’ 
petition for review of the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 
1453(c)(1), for the reasons set forth below, we will affirm that 
order.  
 
II.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The issue on this appeal is whether the District Court 
                                                 
1 Defendant ADT Security Services, Inc. is now known as Tyco 
Integrated Security Systems LLC (“TycoIS”).  The change 
occurred during the events giving rise to this action, so we will 
refer to the entity as ADT SSI-Tyco.  In their brief appellants 
refer to TycoIS as ADT SSI’s “reformed corporate successor.”  
Appellants’ br. at 8. 
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should have retained jurisdiction or was required to remand the 
case to the Superior Court.  District courts have jurisdiction, 
where requirements respecting diversity of citizenship and the 
amount in controversy are met, over class actions removed from 
state courts under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).  CAFA 
broadened federal diversity jurisdiction over interstate class 
actions of national importance.  Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 595, 133 S.Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013).  
Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) provides district courts with 
original jurisdiction over cases that have (1) an amount in 
controversy over $5,000,000; (2) minimally diverse parties, 
meaning at least one member of the plaintiff class is a citizen of 
a state different from any defendant; and (3) a class consisting of 
at least 100 members.  Id. at 592, 133 S.Ct. at 1348.  The parties 
do not dispute, and we find that all three factors have been met, 
making this case subject to removal under CAFA unless there is 
an applicable exception to CAFA jurisdiction barring removal.   
 The local controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction, at 
issue here, requires a district court to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction under CAFA over a class action involving a 
uniquely local controversy.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).  We 
have jurisdiction to review a district court’s CAFA remand order 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1), and we review issues of subject 
matter jurisdiction and statutory interpretation de novo.  
Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy Props., Inc., 733 F.3d 497, 502 
(3d Cir. 2013). 
 
III.  BACKGROUND 
In February 2016, Walsh, a New Jersey citizen, filed an 
amended putative class action complaint against defendants in 
  5 
the New Jersey Superior Court.2 Walsh alleged that starting in 
December 2009 he and the class members purchased home 
security equipment and monitoring service from defendants and 
signed contracts that defendants prepared which contained 
illegal provisions relating to fees due on cancellation of the 
contracts.  JA 92 (Am. Compl. ¶ 18).  Walsh advances two 
claims based on the allegedly illegal provisions relating to fees 
due on cancellation of the contracts, one under New Jersey’s 
Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act 
(“TCCWNA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:12–14 et seq., and the 
other under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”), 
N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8–1 et seq.3 
          After Defenders, Inc., an Indiana corporation with its 
principal place of business in that state, removed the case 
invoking CAFA diversity jurisdiction to the District Court, see 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(2)(A), (d)(5)(B), Walsh moved to 
remand the case to the Superior Court.  In his motion he claimed 
that ADT SSI-Tyco’s presence in the case triggered CAFA’s 
local controversy exception under which a district court must 
decline to exercise jurisdiction if the controversy is uniquely 
connected to the state in which the plaintiff originally filed the 
                                                 
2 Walsh pleaded that he was a resident of New Jersey but did not 
plead that he was a citizen of New Jersey.  The notice of 
removal, however, asserted that he was a New Jersey citizen and 
he has not contested that allegation. 
 
3 A magistrate judge in a report and recommendation to the 
District Court set forth Walsh’s claims in more detail, so we 
need not repeat them.  See 2016 WL 6775706, at *1. 
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state court action.4  See Vodenichar, 733 F.3d at 506-07.  Walsh 
argued that the exception applied, inter alia, because (1) ADT 
SSI-Tyco is a local defendant as it is a citizen of New Jersey, the 
state in which Walsh filed the case; (2) ADT SSI-Tyco’s 
conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted; and (3) 
Walsh seeks significant relief from ADT SSI-Tyco.  Walsh had 
to prevail on each argument to trigger the exception.  
The District Court originally denied Walsh’s motion to 
remand, Walsh v. Defenders, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-753, 2016 WL 
6775634 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2016) (“Walsh I”), adopting in part a 
report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, see Walsh v. 
Defenders, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-753, 2016 WL 6775706 (D.N.J. 
July 15, 2016), recommending that it do so.  Nevertheless, the 
Court agreed that ADT SSI-Tyco, though a Delaware LLC had 
New Jersey citizenship and was a local defendant in this New 
Jersey case.5  In fact, ADT SSI-Tyco has been a New Jersey 
                                                 
4 The “local controversy exception” states in relevant part that 
“[a] district court shall decline to exercise [CAFA] jurisdiction . 
. . over a class action in which,” 
 
(II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant— 
(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by 
members of the plaintiff class; 
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant 
basis for the claims asserted by the proposed 
plaintiff class; and 
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action 
was originally filed. . . . 
 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II). 
5 ADT SSI-Tyco is a LLC formed under Delaware Law.  But it 
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citizen since 2012, when it converted from a Delaware 
corporation called ADT SSI, which was a citizen of Delaware 
and Florida, and consequently ADT SSI-Tyco was a local 
defendant when Walsh initiated this action.  But the Court 
denied the motion to remand for reasons that we will explain 
below. 
In considering the matter, the District Court adopted the 
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation observing that 
after ADT SSI-Tyco changed its corporate form and citizenship 
in 2012, it made another important change with respect to its 
business organization.  It assigned its assets and liabilities under 
its residential contracts, including the contracts at issue in this 
case, to ADT LLC, a citizen of Delaware.  But ADT SSI-Tyco 
remained a viable entity after the assignment as it retained its 
commercial contracts and continued its operations.  The Court 
found that ADT SSI-Tyco continued to be a local defendant 
despite the partial transfer of its assets and liabilities because 
“an assignment does not let an assignor off the hook.”  Walsh I, 
2016 WL 6775634, at *2.  Elsewhere in its opinion, however, 
the Court suggested that the transfer could lead to a remand.  
In reliance on Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
724 F.3d 337, 358 (3d Cir. 2013), where we said that “a federal 
court must disregard nominal or formal parties, and can base its 
jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of parties with a real 
interest in the litigation,” the Court stated that “ADTSSI-Tyco 
appears to have no actual interest in the outcome of this 
litigation” because “ADTSSI-Tyco has transferred its liabilities 
                                                                                                             
is a citizen of New Jersey because its sole member is a corporate 
citizen of New Jersey.  See Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. 
Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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to ADT LLC.”  Walsh I, 2016 WL 6775634, at *4 n.5.  It is 
understandable that the Court took this view as Walsh based his 
case on claims arising from contracts that ADT SSI-Tyco 
transferred to ADT LLC. 
The District Court saw other problems with the motion to 
remand because it ruled that Walsh did not show that ADT SSI-
Tyco’s conduct formed a significant basis for the claims of the 
proposed class, a requirement of the local controversy 
exception.  The Court stated that Walsh failed to analyze any of 
the several factors we set out in Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey 
Insurance Co., 561 F.3d 144, 157 n.13 (3d Cir. 2009), to guide 
evaluation of the significant-basis prong of the local controversy 
exception.  Consequently, the Court denied Walsh’s motion to 
remand, and did not reach the final disputed issue of whether 
Walsh sought significant relief from ADT SSI-Tyco, another 
element of the local controversy exception. 
But the District Court did not settle the remand issue with 
its first order for Walsh moved for reconsideration and, in its 
consideration of this motion, the Court reversed its course.  
Walsh v. Defenders, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-753, 2018 WL 555690 
(D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2018) (“Walsh II”).  The Court found that 
Walsh satisfied the significant-basis element of the local 
controversy exception because of “new evidence [Walsh] 
obtained during class discovery.”  Id. at *2.  The new evidence 
showed that ADT SSI-Tyco entered into the allegedly unlawful 
contracts with 35.3% of the putative class, and created the 
standardized contract provisions that form the basis of the entire 
class’s claims.  Id.   The Court found that the evidence satisfied 
several of the factors that we set forth in Kaufman and 
concluded that ADT SSI-Tyco’s conduct formed a significant 
basis for the claims asserted on behalf of the putative class.  Id. 
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The District Court in Walsh II then reached Walsh’s final 
argument that he sought significant relief from ADT SSI-Tyco.  
Id. at *3.  The Court agreed with Walsh that he had done so, 
finding that the relief Walsh sought against ADT SSI-Tyco—
money damages, statutory damages under TCCWNA, treble 
damages under the NJCFA, declaratory and injunctive relief, 
attorneys’ fees and costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest—
was significant enough to satisfy the local controversy exception 
to its jurisdiction.  It thus appeared that all of the elements of the 
local controversy exception were present.  The Court 
accordingly granted Walsh’s motion by order of January 25, 
2018, to reconsider its original ruling in which it had denied the 
remand motion and it remanded the case to the New Jersey 
Superior Court.  Defendants then filed a timely petition for 
interlocutory review of the remand order that we have granted.  
We now consider the remand order on the merits.6   
                                                 
6 There is a procedural wrinkle in this case arising from what 
appears to be Walsh’s understandable pleading error in this 
confusing case.  In his amended complaint, Walsh named as a 
defendant “ADT Security Services, Inc. . . . a foreign [i.e., non-
New Jersey and thus not the ADT SSI-Tyco] corporation. . . .”  
JA 91 (Am. Compl. ¶ 5) and did not include ADT SSI-Tyco as a 
defendant.  The parties agree, however, that ADT SSI, the 
predecessor to ADT SSI-Tyco, was dissolved in 2012 before 
Walsh initiated this case, and that the surviving business 
operates as ADT SSI-Tyco, a limited liability company.  Despite 
naming the wrong entity, Walsh had process served on ADT 
SSI-Tyco.  See JA 292.  Moreover, ADT SSI-Tyco has 
participated in this litigation in several ways:  it appeared with 
representation before the District Court; several briefs filed in 
the District Court were purportedly filed on its behalf; and it 
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
 The local controversy exception to a district court’s 
CAFA class action jurisdiction requires a court to decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over a class action where more than two-
thirds of the proposed plaintiff class members and at least one 
defendant, here ADT SSI-Tyco, are citizens of the state in which 
the suit was filed, here New Jersey, provided that the local 
defendant is one “from whom significant relief is sought by 
members of the plaintiff class” and “whose alleged conduct 
forms a significant basis for the claims asserted.” 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa), (bb).  Defendants do not contend that 
the two-thirds requirement was not met but they do argue that 
ADT SSI-Tyco cannot be considered a local defendant for 
purposes of the exception because it is not a real party in interest 
to this litigation.  In addition, defendants dispute whether the 
“significant relief” and “significant basis” prongs of the local 
controversy exception have been satisfied with respect to ADT 
SSI-Tyco, even if it is considered a local defendant for purposes 
of the CAFA exception.  For the following reasons, we conclude 
that ADT SSI-Tyco is a local defendant under CAFA from 
whom Walsh and the proposed class seek significant relief and 
that its alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims 
asserted.  For those reasons, we will affirm the order remanding 
this action to the state court from which it was removed. 
 A.  ADT SSI-Tyco is a local defendant. 
 Defendants first challenge the conclusion that ADT SSI-
                                                                                                             
joined in the petition for interlocutory review of the Court’s 
remand order.  These facts lead us to treat ADT SSI-Tyco—
rather than ADT SSI—as the real defendant in this case. 
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Tyco is a local defendant.  They recognize that Walsh filed this 
case in a New Jersey state court against ADT SSI-Tyco, and 
they do not deny that, as the District Court recognized, see 
Walsh II, 2018 WL 555690, at *2, ADT SSI-Tyco is a New 
Jersey citizen.  But they claim that ADT SSI-Tyco is merely a 
“nominal party” without “a real interest in  the litigation.”  
Appellants’ br. at 15 (quoting SmithKline Beecham, 724 F.3d at 
358).  Accordingly, they contend that the Court should have 
ignored ADT SSI-Tyco’s citizenship in its jurisdictional 
analysis.  If it had done so then it could not have said that there 
was a defendant who was a citizen of the state in which Walsh 
originally filed the action.  We, however, disagree with 
defendants’ contention that ADT SSI-Tyco is a nominal party.  
To the contrary, ADT SSI-Tyco has an interest in this litigation, 
and the Court correctly considered it in making its decision.   
 In determining whether there is diversity jurisdiction, a 
district court must consider the citizenship of defendants who 
are “real and substantial parties to the controversy.”  Navarro 
Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460, 100 S.Ct. 1779, 1781-82 
(1980).  “Thus, a federal court must disregard nominal or formal 
parties,” id. at 461, 100 S.Ct. at 1782, “and can base its 
jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of parties with ‘a real 
interest in the litigation,’” SmithKline Beecham, 724 F.3d at 358 
(quoting Bumberger v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 952 F.2d 764, 767 
(3d Cir. 1991)). 
 Based on the evidence submitted on the motion to 
remand we believe that the key events on the jurisdictional issue 
were:  (1) ADT SSI, a Delaware corporation, owned and drafted 
the residential contracts at issue here; (2) ADT SSI converted to 
ADT SSI-Tyco, a Delaware limited liability company with New 
Jersey citizenship; and (3) though ADT SSI-Tyco transferred the 
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residential contracts and related liabilities to co-defendant ADT 
LLC it retained and continued to service the commercial 
contracts.  
 When Walsh brought this suit four years after the above 
events, ADT SSI-Tyco was a real and substantial party because 
it allegedly participated in the wrongful conduct in which Walsh 
charges defendants engaged and it has a stake in the outcome of 
this case.  Walsh alleges, and we accept the allegation at this 
stage of the litigation, that ADT SSI-Tyco is at least partly to 
blame for the inclusion of the allegedly illegal terms in the 
security service contracts.  Although the now-defunct ADT SSI 
corporation may have drafted the allegedly illegal terms, any 
liability that ADT SSI could have faced for drafting those terms 
sits with ADT SSI-Tyco because when a Delaware corporation 
converts to a Delaware LLC as happened here, when ADT SSI 
converted to ADT SSI-Tyco, Delaware statutory law 
automatically transfers the corporation’s liabilities to the new 
LLC.  Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18–214(f).  And although ADT 
SSI-Tyco attempted to transfer all potential liability for that 
conduct to ADT LLC, it has not shown that the transfer freed it 
from liability.  Rather, as Walsh asserts, the transfer did not 
have that consequence.  Walsh claims that he can still sue ADT 
SSI-Tyco because the transfer of assets and liabilities from ADT 
SSI-Tyco to ADT LLC could not discharge his claim against 
ADT SSI-Tyco unless he consented to the transfer and the 
discharge, something he did not do.   
 We agree with Walsh’s contention because his claim 
comports with rules that accompany common-law assignments 
of liability and defendants provide no reason why we should 
treat the assignment involved here differently.  See Am. Flint 
Glass Workers Union v. Anchor Resolution Corp., 197 F.3d 76, 
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80 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A party subject to a contractually created 
obligation ordinarily cannot divest itself of liability by 
substituting another in its place without the consent of the party 
owed the duty.”) (internal citation omitted); accord 29 R. Lord, 
Williston on Contracts § 74:27 (4th ed. 2012) (“No one can 
assign his liabilities under a contract without the consent of the 
party to whom he is liable.”).7  Thus, consumers like Walsh who 
signed the residential contracts still can sue ADT SSI-Tyco even 
though it transferred some of its contracts to ADT LLC.  
Inasmuch as the purchaser of its equipment and services can sue 
ADT SSI-Tyco for the alleged wrongs arising from the 
residential contracts for which it is allegedly responsible, it is a 
“real and substantial part[y] to the controversy.”  Navarro, 446 
U.S. at 460, 100 S.Ct. at 1781-82.    
 Defendants argue, however, that we should regard ADT 
SSI-Tyco merely as a nominal party in light of SmithKline 
Beecham, 724 F.3d 337, which was not a CAFA case.  Indeed, 
at one point the District Court made the same suggestion.  See 
Walsh I, 2016 WL 6775634, at *4 n.5.  But SmithKline 
                                                 
7 We would be more receptive to defendants’ argument if this 
were a case of successor liability.  In such cases, where a 
company sells all of its assets to another company, the 
purchasing company may contract to assume the seller’s 
liabilities.  See 15 William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher 
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 7122.  See also 
Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 464 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  But the transfer in this case does not create 
successor liability—nor do defendants claim that it does—
because ADT SSI-Tyco transferred only some assets to ADT 
LLC. 
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Beecham is distinguishable.  In that case SmithKline Beecham, 
a Pennsylvania corporation, was sued, along with several related 
entities over allegations that it manufactured an injurious 
defective pharmaceutical drug.  But before the case was filed, it 
had dissolved as a Pennsylvania corporation, domesticated as a 
Delaware corporation, and converted to a limited liability 
company called GSK LLC.  When the plaintiffs, one of whom 
was a Pennsylvania citizen, subsequently brought the action in 
state court and defendants removed it to the district court, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the case should be remanded because 
SmithKline Beecham and one of the plaintiffs were 
Pennsylvania citizens and thus diversity of citizenship was 
absent.  Plaintiffs claimed that the former SmithKline Beecham 
should be considered in the jurisdiction analysis as it was still a 
real party in interest because Pennsylvania statutory law 
preserved a dissolved corporation’s interest in litigation against 
it.   
 We accepted the principle that dissolved companies can 
be interested parties where statutes like Pennsylvania’s render 
the companies “sufficiently alive to sue . . .” SmithKline 
Beecham, 724 F.3d at 358 (quoting Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. 
Klaxon Co., 115 F.2d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 1940), rev’d on other 
grounds, 313 U.S. 487, 495-97, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021-22 (1941)), 
but we emphasized that SmithKline Beecham did not merely 
dissolve.  Rather, it domesticated as a new entity in Delaware 
which has “has stepped into SmithKline Beecham’s shoes” 
because “under Delaware law, all of SmithKline Beecham’s 
debts, liabilities and duties now lie with GSK LLC.”  Id. at 359 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  In these 
circumstances, we concluded that SmithKline Beecham had 
become a nominal party and we disregarded its citizenship for 
purposes of diversity jurisdiction.   
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 Defendants claim that we should treat ADT SSI-Tyco 
like SmithKline Beecham, and, by extension, treat ADT LLC, 
which is not a New Jersey citizen, like GSK LLC.  Appellants’ 
br. at 17.  But the entities are in different positions.  Unlike 
SmithKline Beecham, which dissolved completely and passed 
all of its liability to GSK LLC, ADT SSI-Tyco is an active entity 
that has not dissolved.  It did not pass all of its liabilities to ADT 
LLC, to the end that ADT LLC “has stepped into [its] shoes”; 
rather, ADT SSI-Tyco is subject to liability in this case, 
depending on its outcome,8 and can defend the claims against it. 
 Accordingly, SmithKline Beecham does not preclude us from 
holding that ADT SSI-Tyco is a real party in interest in this 
case.   
 In sum, we agree with the District Court’s ultimate 
conclusion that ADT SSI-Tyco is a local defendant under 
CAFA.  ADT SSI-Tyco has an interest in the litigation and the 
Court correctly took into account its citizenship for the purposes 
of determining subject matter jurisdiction. 
 B.  Other elements of the local controversy exception are 
satisfied. 
 We now consider the two remaining disputed prongs of 
the local controversy exception:  First, whether the proposed 
class seeks “significant relief” from ADT SSI-Tyco and second, 
whether ADT SSI-Tyco’s conduct “forms a significant basis for 
the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa), (bb).9 
                                                 
8 We, of course, are not implying that we have any view on the 
merits of this case. 
9 There is no dispute on this appeal with respect to the presence 
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 We have no difficulty in concluding that Walsh’s 
amended complaint seeks significant relief from ADT SSI-Tyco. 
 In evaluating whether the amended complaint seeks significant 
relief from a given defendant, we look to the complaint rather 
than extrinsic materials such as those on which defendants rely, 
as the complaint is the best evidence of the relief that the 
plaintiffs seek.  See Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 631 
F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011).  In an instructive opinion on 
the significant relief prong of the local controversy exception, 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit observed that based 
on the plain language of the statute, “a defendant from whom 
significant relief is sought does not mean a defendant from 
whom significant relief may be obtained.”  Coffey v. Freeport 
McMoran Copper & Gold, 581 F.3d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 
2009) (quotation marks omitted).  Coffey rejected the 
proposition that a local defendant’s “financial viability” should 
factor into the preliminary analysis of whether significant relief 
is being sought.  Id.  Similarly, the possibility that another entity 
ultimately might satisfy a judgment against ADT SSI-Tyco by 
virtue of the reallocation of ADT SSI-Tyco’s liabilities between 
itself and ADT LLC has no bearing on whether plaintiffs seek 
                                                                                                             
of the other elements of the local controversy exception, which 
require that at least two-thirds of the proposed plaintiff class 
members be citizens of the local forum, that the “principal 
injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related 
conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which 
the action was originally filed” and that “during the 3–year 
period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class 
action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual 
allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same 
or other persons[.]”  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A). 
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significant relief from ADT SSI-Tyco in the first instance. 
 Walsh’s amended complaint seeks the following relief 
with respect to ADT SSI-Tyco:  monetary relief for the class 
pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:32-1(b)(3); statutory 
damages under the TCCWNA; declaratory, injunctive, and 
monetary relief for the subclass comprised of class members 
whose contracts were terminated early; treble damages under the 
NJCFA; and reasonable fees, costs, and interest.10  We conclude 
that these requests for relief collectively constitute “significant 
relief” for purposes of the local controversy exception. 
 Finally, we consider whether ADT SSI-Tyco’s conduct 
provides a significant basis for the claims that Walsh asserts.  As 
we observed in Kaufman, a court must analyze the significance 
of a defendant’s conduct in relation to that of the other 
defendants in light of the plain meaning of the word 
“significant.”  See Kaufman, 561 F.3d 144, 157 (defining 
“significant” as “important, notable”) (quoting Oxford English 
Dictionary (2d ed. 1989)).  Walsh argues that ADT SSI-Tyco’s 
conduct forms a significant basis for the proposed class’s claims 
because ADT SSI-Tyco used the allegedly illegal contract 
provisions at issue and because ADT SSI-Tyco entered into 
allegedly unlawful alarm-service contracts with 35.3% of class 
members.  
 While we have observed that the significant basis prong 
                                                 
10 We do not need to address the possibility that fees and costs 
should not be regarded as relief that a plaintiff is seeking for 
CAFA purposes even though in some contexts a claim for 
counsel fees might not be regarded as a claim for damages. 
 
  18 
“does not establish an absolute quantitative requirement” for the 
number of class members asserting claims based on a local 
defendant’s conduct, the number of claims involving the local 
defendant can be a helpful consideration in the analysis.  
Kaufman, 561 F.3d at 155-56.  We agree with the District Court 
that Walsh’s evidence satisfies the required showing for the 
significant basis prong of the local controversy exception.11  
Walsh II, 2018 WL 555690, at *3.  Though a greater number of 
class members entered into alarm-services contracts with ADT 
LLC than with ADT SSI-Tyco, the local controversy exception 
does not require that the local defendant’s conduct be the most 
significant conduct or that it predominates over claims against 
other defendants.  Because of ADT SSI-Tyco’s role with respect 
to the use of allegedly illegal provisions, and because over a 
third of the class members entered into contracts directly with 
ADT SSI-Tyco, it is clear that ADT SSI-Tyco’s conduct forms a 
significant basis for the claims of the class.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the 
District Court did not err in remanding this action to the state 
court based on CAFA’s local controversy exception to the 
exercise of its jurisdiction.  Because ADT SSI-Tyco is a local 
defendant and the elements of the exception are otherwise 
satisfied, we will affirm the remand order of January 25, 2018, 
                                                 
11 Although the District Court considered evidence of the 
proportion of class members that entered into contracts with 
ADT SSI-Tyco, we conclude that the significant basis prong has 
been satisfied by the allegations in the amended complaint 
alone. 
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under consideration. 
 
 
